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HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS:  
A NON-DELEGABLE DUTY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT 
SERVICES 
Ryan Montefusco
∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the tort system can be reduced to one basic princi-
ple: the judiciary imposes legal responsibility on certain actors for 
certain conduct in order to remedy past harms and influence pro-
spective behavior.  Over the course of its existence, our judiciary has 
designated particular actors deserving of legal responsibility for vari-
ous reasons.  Guiding this imposition, however, is the will and per-
ception of the general public.  Because legal responsibility is attribut-
ed, in large part, on the basis of public perception, the community of 
actors to which it applies will change in step with those interests and 
activities that our society deems most important. 
One of the most recent—and most dramatic—changes to our 
tort system concerns the judiciary’s imposition of legal responsibility 
on hospitals for the negligent conduct of independent contractor 
physicians.  The medical community’s ability to offer safe and effec-
tive healthcare services has improved significantly since the turn of 
the twentieth century.  Aided by advanced technologies, medical pro-
fessionals are now more capable of providing local communities with 
quality care.  Through the eyes of the treated public, this develop-
ment has been most clearly witnessed within the landscape of hospital 
operations. 
So influenced by the public recognition of hospitals as vessels for 
medical treatment, such institutions have endeavored to distinguish 
themselves in the healthcare field.  This undertaking has been 
marked by increased self-advertising and overall commercialization of 
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the industry.
1
  Through the success of this practice, however, hospi-
tals have observed both positive and negative consequences of 
heightened public exposure.  Despite benefiting institutions mone-
tarily, the long-desired image of hospitals as complete-care institu-
tions has compelled social reliance.
2
  This, in turn, has given rise to 
greater legal responsibility and resulted in expanded notions of liabil-
ity for negligent conduct born within hospital facilities.
3
 
Heightened expectations of accountability are most evident in 
the judiciary’s recent assignment of liability to hospitals for the tor-
tious conduct of independent contractor physicians.
4
  Notwithstand-
ing hospitals’ ostensible contractual delegation of liability, courts 
have increasingly held hospitals liable for the negligent actions of in-
dependent contractor physicians.
5
  Though this accurately reflects so-
cietal expectations, the vehicle through which courts have appor-
tioned fault is inconsistent with the underlying goals of the tort 
system. 
This Comment seeks to explore the evolution of hospital liability 
as motivated by changes in societal expectations of the institution.  
Part II of this Comment analyzes the impact of public policy on hos-
pital liability for both employee and independent contractor physi-
cians.  Part III explains and criticizes the procedural methods pres-
ently used in apportioning fault to hospitals for the negligent 
conduct of independent contractor physicians.  Part IV of this Com-
ment concludes that the imposition of anon-delegable duty to pro-
vide non-negligent support services on hospitals will realign current 
schemes of liability with the underlying goals of the tort system, while 
simultaneously reflecting the honest expectations of the public. 
 
 1 Glover v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 2001). 
 2  Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) 
 3  See id. (“The public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as 
a full service provider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national 
trend toward adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the 
appropriate circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within 
its walls.”). 
 4 See id.  
 5 See Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 152 (Ind. 1999) (“[U]nder 
some circumstances, . . . written notice may not suffice if the patient had an inade-
quate opportunity to make an informed choice.”). 
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II. EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY 
A. Early Hospital Immunity 
Hospitals were traditionally immune from suit in tort under the 
doctrine of charitable immunity.
6
  The charitable immunity doctrine 
exempted charitable organizations from claims of tort liability 
brought by the beneficiaries of the subject entity’s health care offer-
ings.
7
  Application of this general immunity was motivated in large 
part by public perception of hospital organizations as caregivers insu-
lated from profit-based incentives.
8
  Standards of hospital operation 
in the nineteenth century necessitated the exemption of hospitals 
from tort suits brought by aggrieved patients.
9
  During that time, hos-
pitals were known for “providing medical services to the lowest classes 
of society, without regard to a patient’s ability to pay.”
10
  Given the 
philanthropic motivation of such institutions, the application of tort 
liability was thought to be inappropriate and inconsistent with socie-
tal interest.
11
 
In addition to policy-based considerations, the roots of charita-
ble immunity are also traceable to trust doctrine.
12
  Under this doc-
trine, charitable hospitals maintained insulation from suit in tort in 
order to prevent the unintended diversion of trust funds.
13
  Specifical-
ly, it was understood that donations made for the benefit of the hos-
pital’s mission were held in public trust for the same purpose.
14
  It was 
therefore observed that if such funds “could be used to compensate 
persons for negligently inflicted injuries, the trust fund would be di-
 
 6 ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION 
539 (2d ed., 1988). 
 7 See Howard Levin, Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence by Independent Contrac-
tor Physicians: A New Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2005). 
 8 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the 
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 385 (1994). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Levin, supra note 7, at 1294. 
 11 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 385 (“The main justification for chari-
table immunity was an implied waiver by patients who were receiving services free of 
charge.  But the implied waiver applied to paying as well as non-paying patients, and 
to unconscious as well as conscious admittees to the hospital.”). 
 12  See Rhoda v. Aroostook Gen. Hosp., 226 A.2d 530, 532 (Me. 1967) (“The ra-
tionale of the immunity rule in favor of charitable institutions lay in the bounden du-
ty of a public charity as a trustee to apply its funds in furtherance of its beneficent 
purpose.”). 
 13 See id.  
 14 See, e.g., Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 73 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1952). 
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verted to purposes never intended by the donor.”
15
  Because of these 
concerns, courts generally immunized charitable hospitals from suit 
to preserve the funds available for the hospitals’ use and to further 
incentivize charitable donations in the healthcare field.
16
 
B. Demise of Charitable Immunity 
Though well intentioned, even at the outset of its application, 
the charitable immunity doctrine was criticized by some members of 
the judiciary.
17
  In Georgetown College v. Hughes, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia condemned the liability exemption be-
cause of its inconsistency in application and confused premise.
18
  The 
Georgetown College court criticized the immunity’s basis in trust doc-
trine—noting that “[n]o statistical evidence has been presented to 
show that the mortality or crippling of charities has been greater in 
states which impose full or partial liability than where complete or 
substantially full immunity is given.” 
19
  Thus, the court determined 
that the exposure of hospitals to liability in tort would not critically 
obstruct the purpose of such charitable organizations.
20
 
Changes in the nature of hospital operations motivated further 
criticism of the doctrine of charitable immunity.
21
  At its outset, the 
doctrine of charitable immunity was premised on the understanding 
that hospitals provided mere facilities within which individual physi-
cians administered actual care.
22
  Based on their separation from pa-
tient care, hospitals could not bear the responsibility for the wrong-
doings of acting physicians.
23
 
The gradual evolution of hospital offerings, however, significant-
ly diminished the viability of such justifications.  Specifically, the med-
ical field witnessed a growing trend towards greater hospital involve-
ment in patient care.
24
  Consistent with this development, hospitals 
began to adopt the role of “full-service healthcare providers” and re-
jected the notion that their role was limited to the provision of a 
 
 15 Id. at 669. 
 16 See, e.g., Downs v. Harper Hosp., 60 N.W. 42 (Mich. 1894). 
 17 See, e.g., Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).   
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. at 823. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).   
 22 Martin C. Williams & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for Torts of Inde-
pendent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 435 (1996). 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. at 436. 
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physical structure alone.
25
  The Court of Appeals of New York in Bing 
v. Thunig accurately summarized this perceived evolution.
26
  Specifi-
cally, the court stated that 
[t]he conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the 
patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, 
but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their 
own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact.  Present-day hospi-
tals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far 
more than furnish facilities for treatment.
27
 
Judicial recognition of this reality gradually compelled the realization 
that hospital accountability in tort was no longer inconsistent with so-
ciety’s interests.
28
 
Observation of this trend and newfound public image was moti-
vated further by hospital advertisements of offered services.
29
  Argua-
bly, the increased presence of hospitals in patient care and the result-
ing commercialization of such practices significantly affected public 
perception of hospitals as healthcare providers.
30
  Commentators 
have identified the consequences of this commercialization as includ-
ing both a “loss of public sympathy” and a perceived expansion of le-
gal accountability.
31
 
The court in Bing determined that “the person who avails him-
self of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure 
him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own re-
sponsibility.”
32
  Thus, the Bing court rejected the application of chari-
table immunity and held that hospital liability was to be construed 
under the same legal principles as those guiding general employer 
liability.
33
  Following the signaled demise of charitable immunity in 
Georgetown College and Bing, all states gradually rejected the doctrine 
by the latter half of the twentieth century.
34
 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8–9.  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.   
 29 See, e.g., Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 408, 411 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1998); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W. 2d 277, 278 (Wis. 1992). 
 30 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 436. 
 31 Id.  
 32 Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 385.  
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C. Contemporary Hospital Liability 
The obvious consequence of charitable immunity’s erosion was 
increased hospital liability for the negligent activity of hospital staff.  
Consistent with most organizations, present analysis of hospital liabil-
ity for actions in tort is necessarily dependent upon the employment 
classification of subject staff members.
35
  Hospitals have traditionally 
staffed their facilities with both direct employees and independent 
contractors.
36
  In most cases, hospitals enter into employer-employee 
relationships with nurses, technicians, and resident physicians.
37
  Be-
yond that, however, the vast majority of physicians regarded as “hos-
pital staff” enjoy an independent contractor relationship with the 
overseeing institution rather than an employer-employee relation-
ship.
38
  Hospitals will generally be liable for the tortious conduct of 
their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
39
  
Respondeat superior is a form of strict liability imputed to a principal 
employer based on its legal relationship with the subject agent.
40
 
As a condition of employer liability under respondeat superior, 
the court must find that an employee of the employer committed the 
underlying tort, and that the tortious act occurred while the employ-
ee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.
41
  Within the 
specific context of hospital operations, the plaintiff must first prove 
his or her claim of medical malpractice against the acting physician.
42
  
Next, the plaintiff must set forth facts sufficient to prove the existence 
of an agency relationship between the acting physician and the sub-
ject hospital.
43
  Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions 
of the treating physician that gave rise to medical malpractice were 
committed within the scope of that employer-employee relationship.
44
  
Where a plaintiff succeeds in satisfying these elements of a 
respondeat superior claim, the hospital will be held liable for the ac-
tions of treating employee-physicians without inquiry into any poten-
tial fault of the institution.
45
 
 
 35 Levin, supra note 7, at 1295.  
 36 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 387. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.   
 39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957). 
 40 Id.  
 41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id.  
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The doctrine of respondeat superior, however, would not im-
pose liability on hospitals for torts that independent contractor physi-
cians who practice within the same facility commit.
46
  Section 2 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an independent contractor 
as one “who contracts with another to do something for him but who 
is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to con-
trol with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the 
undertaking.”
47
  The primary difference between an employer-
employee relationship and an independent contractor relationship is 
the extent to which an employer-principal may exercise control over 
the actions of the subject agent.
48
  In theory, the independent con-
tractor relationship is predicated on autonomy in execution of the 
contracted service and is largely removed from the principal’s con-
trolling influence.
49
 
Courts hold that principals may not be held liable for the negli-
gent conduct of independent contractor agents because of the ab-
sence of control in this relationship.
50
  Within the specific context of 
tort liability, courts have generally indicated that “it would be unfair 
to hold a master liable for the conduct of another when the master 
has no control over that conduct.”
51
  Thus, principal non-liability 
within this relationship is a consequence of the tort system’s underly-
ing purpose.
52
  The tort system assumes “that imposing liability on the 
immediate tortfeasor will deter future actors from engaging in mal-
practice.”
53
  If one recognizes that an objective of imputing liability 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior concerns the influence of 
prospective behavior, it logically follows that only those principals ca-
pable of exercising control over the tortfeasor should be subject to 
liability.  Hence, where hospitals lack control over their agents in 
providing healthcare services, such institutions, in theory, should not 
be liable for tortious conduct arising therefrom. 
A hospital traditionally contracts for the services of independent 
contractor physicians for the very purpose of insulating the institu-
tion from liability in tort: “[P]rincipals such as hospitals do not want 
to be . . . liable for the torts of true independent contractors” as the 
 
 46 Id. § 219 cmt. a. 
 47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957). 
 48 Id. § 220. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. 1999). 
 51 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965)). 
 52 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407. 
 53 Id. 
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conduct of such agents is necessarily “beyond the control or the right 
of control of the principal.”
54
  Given the potential for independent-
contractor-based defenses to negligence suits, most hospitals express-
ly describe their relationships with physicians as those of principal 
and independent contractor in their contracts for services.
55
  Based 
on this common practice, hospitals should generally escape liability 
for the misconduct of staff physicians.  Despite their attempted insu-
lation from liability, however, hospitals have been exposed to liability 
for the actions of independent contractor physicians with increasing 
frequency.
56
  As with the policy considerations motivating the judicial 
erosion of charitable immunity, the public perception of hospitals as 
complete-care institutions has influenced the relaxation of agency 
principles concerning hospital liability for the tortious conduct of in-
dependent contractor physicians.
57
 
Increased adoption of exceptions to the independent contractor 
liability rule of principal non-liability reflects the public recognition 
that hospitals are “corporate entities capable of acting only through 
human beings.”
58
  Recently, marketing tactics undertaken by the same 
institutions have heavily influenced public perception of hospitals’ 
roles in healthcare provision.
59
  In reviewing the potential liability of a 
hospital for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor physi-
cian, courts have observed that 
[m]odern hospitals have spent billions on marketing to nurture 
the image that they are full-care modern facilities.  Billboards, tel-
evision commercials and newspaper advertisements tell the public 
to look to its local hospital for every manner of care, from the crit-
ical surgery and life-support required by a major accident to mi-
nor tissue repairs resulting from a friendly game of softball.60 
Representations of “full-service offerings” create the impression that 
hospitals provide medical services directly to the public.
61
  While such 
 
 54 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 439.  
 55 Id.    
 56 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 388. 
 57 Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The pub-
lic’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider 
of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward adopting 
a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate circum-
stances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”). 
 58 Id. at 94 n.8 (quoting Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. at 93 (quoting Glover v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 551 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 Id. 
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measures have likely resulted in increased business for the hospital-
advertiser, this “new role” of hospital service offerings has also result-
ed in “heightened exposure to lawsuits.”
62
  Courts have observed that 
contemporary society generally relies on hospitals as institutions dur-
ing patient admission.
63
  Specifically, courts have recognized that “the 
changing role of the hospital in society creates a likelihood that pa-
tients will look to the institution rather than the individual physician 
for care.”
64
  Judicial treatment of hospital liability for the actions of its 
contract physicians demonstrates that such social reliance is deserv-
ing of legal protection. 
Owing to such considerations, judicial analysis of hospital liabil-
ity has yielded two primary exceptions to the general rule of principal 
non-liability.  Courts have evaluated hospital liability through the lens 
of either agency by estoppel or apparent agency.
65
  The following dis-
cussion seeks to analyze the efficacy of applying such tests to the rela-
tionship between hospitals and independent contractor physicians.  
Analysis of these rules reveals that, though seemingly reflective of so-
cietal expectations, application of agency-based exceptions to the 
general rule of principal non-liability presents a number of proce-
dural and substantive challenges for the judiciary. 
III. HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR PHYSICIANS 
A. Agency by Estoppel 
Following the complete erosion of hospital charitable immunity, 
courts in various jurisdictions began imposing liability on hospitals 
for the acts of independent contractor physicians operating within 
the hospital facility under theories of agency by estoppel.
66
  Applica-
tion of agency by estoppel is appropriate in circumstances in which, 
as in the case of the relationship between a hospital and an inde-
pendent contractor physician, no agency exists between the tortfea-
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 n.8 (W. Va. 2004) (quot-
ing Parker v. Freilich, 803 A.2d 738, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 65 See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Ak. 1987) (“Cases from other juris-
dictions show a strong trend toward liability against hospitals that permit or encour-
age patients to believe that independent contractor/physicians are, in fact, author-
ized agents of the hospitals.  These courts have held hospitals vicariously liable under 
a doctrine labeled either ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ agency or ‘agency by estoppel.’”) 
 66 See, e.g., Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1980). 
MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  5:21 PM 
1346 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1337 
sor and the apparent principal.
67
  Though designated “apparent 
agency,” Section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency recog-
nizes an estoppel-based exception to the general rule of principal 
non-liability.
68
  The doctrine of agency by estoppel applies to those 
situations in which a person or entity “represents that another is his 
servant or other agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to 
rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent.”
69
  Courts will im-
pose liability under these circumstances because of the “appearance” 
that the apparent agent was acting on behalf of the person or entity 
at issue.
70
 
In order to satisfy the doctrine’s requirements, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he or she submitted to the care of an apparent 
agent in response to an invitation extended by the apparent princi-
pal.
71
  Agency by estoppel “rests upon the theory that one has been 
led to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment.”
72
  Fun-
damentally, this exception to the rule of principal non-liability de-
pends on the existence of (1) representations made by an apparent 
principal indicating the existence of an agency relationship between 
the apparent principal and agent and (2) the plaintiff’s reliance 
thereon.
73
  Where an individual patient is harmed as a result of his or 
her reliance on the hospital’s representation, agency by estoppel cre-
ates a channel for recovery despite the hospital’s contractual insula-
tion from liability. 
Upon review of this test’s requirements, it appears that the chal-
lenging plaintiffs bear a significant burden in establishing hospital li-
ability.
74
  Yet contemporary application of this agency-based exception 
has yielded waves of relaxation designed to impose hospital liability in 
particular instances.  That the judiciary has refrained from applying 
this test with deserving rigor reflects the public recognition that, un-
der certain circumstances, hospitals should be liable for the actions of 
their independent contractor physicians.
75
  The following analysis of 
 
 67 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 447.   
 68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. § 267 cmt. a. 
 72 Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio 1943).   
 73 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 447. 
 74 Id. at 448 (citing Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d 632, 637 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1987)). 
 75 Id.  
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the judicial departure from the test’s explicit requirements illustrates 
this purpose. 
1. Agency by Estoppel: Representation Requirement 
Under the articulated terms of the test, a plaintiff must first 
prove that the hospital represented that a plaintiff’s treating physi-
cian was a servant or another agent of the hospital.
76
  Proof of this 
representation or “holding out” by the hospital must consist of acts 
committed by the subject hospital that demonstrate its apparent rela-
tionship with the treating physicians.
77
  Comments to section 267 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency specifically provide that “[t]he 
mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party believes 
to be the defendant’s servant is not sufficient to cause the apparent 
master to be liable.”
78
  This element of agency by estoppel seeks to de-
termine whether hospitals took actions sufficient to influence the 
reasonable conclusion that a treating physician was an agent of the 
hospital.
79
 
At first glance, it appears that the requirement of a representa-
tion or “holding out” on the part of the hospital stands as a signifi-
cant obstacle to plaintiff’s recovery.
80
  In order to satisfy the general 
requirements of agency representation, courts should require a plain-
tiff to show that the hospital engaged in an “intentional misleading, 
or an unreasonable or bad faith failure to speak after notice . . . caus-
ing a third party justifiably to rely upon the apparent agent.”
81
 
Despite this seemingly weighty standard, courts have more fre-
quently loosened the plaintiff’s burden of proving active representa-
tions.
82
  Rather than requiring plaintiffs to set forth actual proof of 
hospital representations, courts have actually presumed the hospital to 
have “held itself out” as maintaining an agency relationship with 
treating physicians.
83
  Justification for this broad-based easing in ap-
plication wholly derives from “[t]he public’s confidence in the mod-
ern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service provider of health 
care.”
84
  As a consequence of this recognized social reliance, future 
 
 76 Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990). 
 77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a (1958). 
 78 Id.   
 79 Espalin v. Children’s Med. Ctr., 27 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).   
 80 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 448. 
 81 Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. at 448.  
 83 Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).   
 84 Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004). 
MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  5:21 PM 
1348 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1337 
review of the “representation” requirement will likely be minimal.  In 
future litigation, hospitals will generally be deemed to have repre-
sented the existence of an agency relationship with its independent 
contract physicians unless it is proven otherwise. 
Relaxation of the representation requirement reflects the be-
ginnings of a result-oriented approach towards hospital liability.  Pre-
sumptive findings of hospital representation have undoubtedly eased 
the burden of persuasion that aggrieved plaintiffs carry, and, im-
portantly, this practice suggests judicial approval of hospital liability 
in certain circumstances.  Indeed, this manner of treatment is also ev-
ident in the judiciary’s analysis of the test’s remaining requirements. 
2. Agency by Estoppel: Reliance Requirement 
True application of agency by estoppel requires plaintiffs to 
demonstrate both the existence of a hospital representation and their 
reliance thereon.
85
  Early application of the reliance requirement 
within the context of agency by estoppel focused primarily upon det-
rimental reliance.
86
  Though courts initially adhered to this principle, 
a majority of jurisdictions applying the agency-by-estoppel test to de-
termine hospital liability have now replaced the requirement of det-
rimental reliance with mere “justifiable reliance.”
87
  This transition 
indicates a judicial trend toward substantiating claims by aggrieved 
patients against apparent principal hospitals.  Importantly, courts 
have permitted plaintiffs to satisfy the reliance requirement upon a 
showing of reliance on the general reputation of a specific hospital ra-
ther than demanding proof of reliance upon specific acts of the insti-
tution.
88
 
Even accepting this relaxed standard, however, frequently occur-
ring factual scenarios which give rise to medical malpractice have 
forced courts to strain the bounds of this analysis.  For example, 
proof of reliance may be particularly difficult within the context of 
emergency room admission.  In a typical scenario, individuals requir-
 
 85 Id. at 95. 
 86 See N. Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 
1988) (“A third person cannot invoke the doctrine of apparent agency, thereby es-
tablishing rights against the principal, without detrimental reliance.”). 
 87  See Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 618 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2005) (“Under 
the stricter standard of § 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which embrac-
es the theory of agency by estoppel, a showing of justifiable reliance by the injured 
person upon the representations of the principal is required; whereas,  reliance is 
not a factor in § 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”). 
 88 Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Sisters of St. Mary, 637 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994).   
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ing immediate medical attention will likely call an ambulance, family 
member, or close friend for transportation to the hospital.  This situ-
ation presents two distinct questions for proof of reliance under any 
standard.  First, can it truly be said that a patient maintains a mean-
ingful choice when determining which hospital he or she should visit 
in an emergency scenario?  Second, if the patient is relying on others 
for care in transit to the hospital facility, can reliance on possible rep-
resentations by a hospital be accurately attributed to the individual 
patient? 
Given the common occurrence of such scenarios, courts have of-
ten gone to great lengths to manipulate the reliance requirement of 
estoppel in order to accommodate plaintiffs’ claims.  The most illus-
trative example of judicial manipulation in answering the first ques-
tion concerns instances of claimed negligence where the plaintiff was 
not admitted to the hospital’s emergency room in a conscious state.  
In Monti v. Silver Cross Hospital, the court encountered a factual sce-
nario in which the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital’s emergency 
room while unconscious.
89
  The plaintiff complained that the hospi-
tal’s failure “to have personnel available who were competent to di-
agnose and treat closed head injuries” caused her a permanent inju-
ry.
90
 
The court determined that the individuals acting on behalf of 
the plaintiff “sought care from the hospital, not from a personal phy-
sician, and thus, a jury could find that they relied upon the fact that 
complete emergency room care, including diagnostic testing and 
support services, would be provided through the hospital staff.”
91
  The 
court in Monti added further, “The same is true for all seriously ill or 
badly injured patients, whether conscious or not, who come to a hos-
pital emergency room for emergency medical care.”
92
  The court de-
termined that the facts of the dispute demonstrated plaintiff’s “im-
plied reliance” on the hospital.
93
 
Addressing the second question posed, courts have also permit-
ted proof of reliance upon a showing of plaintiff’s reliance on oth-
ers.
94
  In Kane v. Doctors Hospital, the plaintiff sued the hospital at issue 
for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor physician.
95
  
 
 89 637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).   
 90 Id.    
 91 Id. at 430.    
 92 Id.   
 93 Id.    
 94 Kane v. Doctors Hosp., 706 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 95 Id. at 72.  
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It was undisputed that the plaintiff did not choose to be admitted to 
the defendant hospital.
96
  Therefore, the hospital argued that because 
the plaintiff did not choose to avail himself of the hospital’s services, 
he could not have possibly relied on any representations made by the 
same institution.
97
  The court in Kane rejected the defendant’s con-
tention and held that, in general, relying on others to choose a par-
ticular medical facility for treatment was sufficient to establish reli-
ance.
98
 
Judicial analysis in Monti and Kane reflects current trends in find-
ing ad hoc exceptions to the general requirement of reliance on hos-
pital representations.
99
  Furthermore, these decisions illustrate the 
general inapplicability of estoppel-based measures to determine hos-
pital liability for negligent independent contractor physicians. The 
judiciary has manipulated this test’s requirements to permit recovery 
against hospitals in certain circumstances despite the hospitals’ con-
tractual insulation from liability.  This manipulation has been driven 
by the public’s belief that hospitals directly administer care.  Such 
practices reflect the understanding that social reliance on hospitals in 
their provision of medical treatment is sufficient to warrant judicial 
protection.  Notwithstanding the widespread relaxation of agency-by-
estoppel requirements, however, courts have increasingly resorted to 
a less stringent—but similarly artificial—theory of hospital liability to 
expand the breadth of this protection. 
B. Apparent Agency 
Courts have more recently transitioned their analysis to the doc-
trine of apparent agency in response to the obvious shortcomings of 
agency by estoppel.
100
  Similar to the doctrine of agency by estoppel, 
 
 96 Id. at 72−73.  Plaintiff was admitted to the defendant hospital at the direction 
of his primary care physician.  Id.    
 97 Id. at 74 (“[T]he Hospital argues that the trial court correctly granted its mo-
tion for summary judgment because the record established that (1) Kane knew Dr. 
Song was not the Hospital’s employee; (2) neither the Hospital nor Dr. Song made 
any representations to Kane that Dr. Song was an agent of the Hospital; (3) Kane did 
not act reasonably in ascertaining Dr. Song’s employment status; and (4) Kane did 
not rely on any representations by the Hospital when he sought radiological treat-
ment.”). 
 98 Id. at 78. 
 99 See id.; Monti v. Silver Cross Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).   
 100 It should be noted that, while apparent agency and agency by estoppel are dis-
tinct tests, courts frequently refer to both processes within the same analysis.  See, e.g., 
Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d 563, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (“Although each theory 
is based on a slightly different rationale, the two theories have been used inter-
changeably,   resulting in misapplication of the law in some cases.”). 
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apparent agency is an exception to the general rule that a principal is 
immune from liability for the negligence of an independent contrac-
tor in the performance of contracted services.
101
  Apparent agency 
imposes liability on an apparent principal when the actions of that 
entity mislead the public that a legal relationship exists between the 
apparent principal and agent.
102
 
Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dictates the 
parameters of this exception to the rule of principal non-liability.
103
  
Section 429 provides that a person or entity who contracts with an 
agent “to perform services for another which are accepted in the rea-
sonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer 
or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by 
the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services.”
104
 
Though similar in many respects, the principle difference be-
tween agency by estoppel under Section 267 of the Restatement (Se-
cond) of Agency and apparent agency under Section 429 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts concerns the requirement of reliance.
105
  
The court in Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hospital concluded that, in con-
trast to the express reliance requirement in Section 267, “[r]eliance is 
an element of apparent authority under section[] . . .  429 only to the 
extent that it is subsumed in the requirement that the person accept-
ing an agent’s services do so in the ‘reasonable belief’ that the service 
is being rendered in behalf of the principal.”
106
  Thus, under Section 
429, a plaintiff must only demonstrate his or her reasonable belief ra-
ther than justifiable reliance to discharge the burden of proof.
107
  Ad-
ditionally, Section 429 disposes of the specific representation re-
 
 101 Basil v. Wolf, 935 A.2d 1154, 1172 (N.J. 2007).   
 102 Id.   
 103 See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 851 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Jackson v. Power, 
743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 
So. 2d 55, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Richmond Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 
S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. 1987); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 
(Ill. 1993); Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Smith v. St. 
Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279, 282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Capan v. Divine Providence 
Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 648–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000) (citing Walker v. Winchester Mem’l Hosp., 585 
F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D. Va. 1984)) (“Numerous courts have relied on section 429 
in decisions allowing a plaintiff to attempt to hold a hospital vicariously liable for a 
purportedly independent physician’s negligent acts.”); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 
667, 672 (Wyo. 1988).  
 104 RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977).   
 105 958 A.2d 101, 106 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).   
 106 Id.    
 107 Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 206 P.3d 473, 478 (Idaho 2009).   
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quirement necessary for a valid claim of agency by estoppel under 
Section 267.
108
 
Within the context of hospital liability, courts have indicated 
that “where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held 
out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a pa-
tient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable 
belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital,” the hospital 
will be liable for the negligent conduct of that physician.
109
  Upon sat-
isfaction of this test, courts hold hospitals liable for the negligent 
misconduct of independent contractor physicians despite the hospi-
tals’ contractual insulation from liability.
110
 
Widespread adoption of apparent agency as a means of imput-
ing liability was necessitated by the seemingly rigid obstacles that 
agency by estoppel imposed.
111
  Yet, the underlying motivation for this 
test derives from the same public policy considerations that led to the 
discussed collapse of charitable immunity.
112
  The Court of Appeals of 
Oregon accurately summarized this recognition in Jennison v. Provi-
dence St. Vincent Medical Center.
113
  There, the court concluded that the 
general public “is unaware of and unconcerned with the technical 
complexities and nuances surrounding the contractual and employ-
ment arrangements between the hospital and the various medical 
personnel operating therein.”
114
  Accordingly, contractual obstacles 
should not limit the tort recovery of those “looking to the hospital” 
for medical care.
115
 
The court’s declaration in Jennison is consistent with that of oth-
er jurisdictions.
116
  In Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital, the New York 
Court of Appeals criticized hospitals for benefitting from the appear-
 
 108 Williams & Russell, supra note 22, at 460.  
 109 Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).   
 110 Id.  
 111 See Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d 563, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)(finding that, 
upon comparison to apparent agency, “[a]gency by estoppel appears to have a strict-
er standard because it requires actual reliance upon the representations of the prin-
cipal”) 
 112 See Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The 
public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service pro-
vider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward 
adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate 
circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”). 
 113 25 P.3d 358, 372 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
 114 Id. at 367. 
 115 Id.  
 116 See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976).   
MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  5:21 PM 
2012] COMMENT 1353 
ance of their relationship with contract physicians while escaping lia-
bility by relying on “secret limitations . . . in a private contract be-
tween the hospital and the doctor.”
117
  On the basis of such public 
policy considerations, hospital liability for independent contractor 
physicians has been pursued expansively under theories of apparent 
agency.
118
 
Demonstration of hospital liability under apparent agency theo-
ries has proven to be comparatively easier than proof of the same un-
der agency by estoppel.
119
  Rather than bearing the burden of proving 
an active representation by the subject hospital, plaintiffs under Sec-
tion 429 must merely demonstrate that the hospital’s actions created 
the reasonable belief that doctors who operate within the facility act-
ed on behalf of the hospital.
120
 
As the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division indicat-
ed in Estate of Cordero, plaintiffs need not establish an active misrepre-
sentation to satisfy the hospital-action requirement under Section 
429.
121
  Significantly, the court concluded that “[a] principal can man-
ifest assent to a person’s action on its behalf by employing an inde-
pendent contractor and sending that contractor to render perfor-
mance requested by another without disclosing that relationship.”
122
  
Thus, the court suggested that plaintiffs could satisfy the hospital-
action requirement of apparent agency by demonstrating the nature 
and position of certain treating physicians who operate within the 
hospital facility.
123
 
The Estate of Cordero court commented on the trend in other ju-
risdictions of courts finding reasonable belief where plaintiffs re-
ceived “specialized care from medical professionals with whom they 
 
 117 Id.; see also Jessamy v. Parkmed Assocs., 761 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003). 
 118 See Sword v. NKC Hosp., 714 N.E.2d 142, 150 (Ind. 1999);  Elizabeth Isbey, 
Note, Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc. and the Emergence of Hospital Liability for Negligent 
Independent-Contractor Physicians in North Carolina, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1127, 1137 
(2008).   
 119 See Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 618 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2005) (“Under 
the stricter standard of § 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which embrac-
es the theory of agency by estoppel, a showing of justifiable reliance by the injured 
person upon the representations of the principal is required; whereas,  reliance is 
not a factor in § 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”). 
 120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977).  
 121 Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 958 A.2d 101, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008).   
 122 Id. at 106. 
 123 Id. 
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[did] not have a prior or ongoing relationship.”
124
  The court further 
added that in situations in which hospitals provide doctors to patients 
without taking further action to “dispel the appearance” of an agency 
relationship, “courts generally treat the hospital’s inaction as addi-
tional conduct manifesting the hospital’s assent to having the special-
ist care for the patient in its behalf.”
125
  In Estate of Cordero, the court 
correctly identified the common trend within various jurisdictions of 
focusing critically on the existence of a doctor’s prior relationship 
with the patient to determine hospital liability.
126
  The judiciary’s em-
phasis on the existence of a prior relationship suggests that, where no 
physician-patient relationship exists before hospital admission, the 
hospital reasonably appears to be offering the medical service direct-
ly.
127
  The Estate of Cordero court indicated that this expectation is most 
relevant within the context of hospitals’ providing specialized support 
services.
128
  These specialized support services—anesthesia, pathology, 
radiology, and emergency care—are typically provided to patients at 
the direction of the hospital as an institution and as a direct conse-
quence of the patient’s immediate medical needs.
129
  Judicial scrutiny 
of the hospital’s role in providing these services strongly suggests the 
importance of considering specialized support services in future anal-
ysis.
130
 
 
 124 Id. at 107.  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Citron v. N. Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (find-
ing that when a plaintiff entered the hospital through the emergency room, the hos-
pital’s employees called a number of physicians to treat the plaintiff, and the plaintiff 
had no prior physician-patient relationship with any of the treating physicians, the 
plaintiff “could properly assume that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital 
were acting on behalf of the hospital”).   
 128 Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 109. 
 129 See e.g., Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 857 (Wis. 1988) 
(“An individual who seeks care from a hospital itself, as opposed to care from his or 
her personal physician, accepts care from the hospital in reliance upon the fact that 
complete emergency room care—from blood testing to radiological readings to the 
endless medical support services—will be provided by the hospital through its 
staff.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (Cal. 1955) (holding that trial court 
erred in taking issue of hospital’s ostensible agency for anesthesiologist from jury); 
Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1162–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the hospital’s liability for radiologist’s negligence when 
radiology department was located within hospital grounds under doctrine of appar-
ent agency); Sword v. NKC Hospital, 714 N.E.2d 142, 152–53 (Ind. 1999) (finding 
issue of fact as to hospital’s liability for anesthesiologist); Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 
109 (finding that patients  can reasonably assume that a hospital furnishes the care 
rendered in its facility and holding hospital liable under doctrine of apparent au-
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Given the continued trend towards expanding hospital liability 
for the negligence of independent contractor physicians, one can an-
ticipate that, in almost all circumstances of future medical harm aris-
ing out of specialized support services, aggrieved patients will name 
the hospital as an additional defendant.  This conclusion is drawn on 
the basis of consistent prior success: 
[V]icarious liability suits have been successfully launched against 
hospitals for the alleged negligence of anesthesiologists, radiolo-
gists, pathologists, and even occasionally against a surgeon whose 
services the patient used because he was on hospital staff. . . .  Un-
der the doctrine of apparent authority, the fact that the medical 
specialists performing these functions happen to have an inde-
pendent-contractor rather than employment relationship with the 
hospital will not insulate the hospital from vicarious liability for 
their malpractice.
131
 
Indeed, the only genuine obstacle to patient recovery against 
hospitals for negligence arising out of specialized support services is 
the requirement that the patient’s belief be reasonable.
132
  Consistent-
ly with the general trend in hospital liability, however, courts have 
shown no hesitation in massaging the reasonableness requirement to 
accommodate factual circumstances giving rise to claims of medical 
malpractice.
133
 
Courts have generally presumed that hospitals hold themselves 
out as the providers of care unless they afford “notice to the patient 
that [they are] not the provider[s] of care and that the care is pro-
vided by a physician who is an independent contractor and not sub-
ject to the control and supervision of the hospital.”
134
  In order to re-
but the presumption of reasonableness, courts have required proof 
establishing the hospital’s provision of “meaningful written notice” 
delivered to the patient upon hospital admission that demonstrates 
the “true” nature of its relationship with staff physicians.
135
  Again, it 
appears that the availability of a notice rebuttal would generally pre-
 
thority for anesthesiologist’s negligence); Jennisort v. Providence St. Vincent Med. 
Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 367 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that radiological services are “in-
tegral to the overall medical services provided by the hospital”).  
 131 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 388. 
 132 Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Sword v. NKC Hospital, 714 N.E.2d 142, 152 (Ind. 1999); see also Henry v. Flag-
staff Med. Ctr., 132 P.3d 304, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Wishard Mem. Hosp. v. Kerr, 
846 N.E.2d 1083, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 106 n.3; 
Butler v. Domin, 15 P.3d 1189, 1196 (Mont. 2000). 
 135 Henry, 132 P.3d at 306; Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 152; Wishard Mem. Hosp., 846 
N.E.2d at 1091; Butler, 15 P.3d at 1196. 
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vent the imputation of liability to an apparent-principal hospital.  
Due to the unique nature of most hospital admissions and the public 
demands for hospitals’ accountability, however, courts have largely 
disregarded hospitals’ attempts at liability disclaimer.
136
 
Judicial analysis of the “meaningfulness” requirement has gener-
ally resulted in three specific problems.  First, courts are often incon-
sistent in their determinations of what constitutes “meaningful no-
tice.”
137
  Second, where individual patients are admitted to the hospi-
hospital facility through emergency room entry, courts are not likely 
to deem these individuals capable of reflecting on the notice provid-
ed.
138
  In these circumstances, courts will typically disregard hospitals’ 
attempts at notice, even where the form provided a sufficient dis-
claimer.
139
  Finally, courts have increasingly disregarded liability dis-
claimers on public policy grounds.
140
  Some courts have found that 
hospitals should not be permitted to “give notice that operates as a 
waiver of liability under any circumstances because of patients’ inabil-
ity to make a reasonable choice as to their physician, whether an em-
ployee or independent contractor, once they arrive at the hospital.”
141
 
Theoretically, any demonstration of a patient’s actual knowledge 
of the subject hospital’s legitimate non-servant relationship with a 
physician should be sufficient to dispel claims of apparent agency.
142
  
This is so because apparent agency is predicated on a patient’s rea-
sonable belief that the physician is acting on behalf of the hospital.
143
  
Yet, courts have continually disregarded hospitals’ attempts to edu-
cate patients through the use of admission forms that indicate that 
 
 136 See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Hen-
ry, 132 P.3d 304; Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 (W. Va. 2004);. 
 137 Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47. 
 138 Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“Many courts have even concluded that prior notice may not be suffi-
cient to avoid liability in an emergency room context, where an injured patient in 
need of immediate medical care cannot be expected to understand or act upon that 
information.”). 
 139 See id.   
 140 Sampson v. Baptist Mem. Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. App. 1996). 
 141 Isbey, supra note 118, at 1146–47. 
 142 Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358, 368 (Or. Ct. App. 
2001).  In order to satisfy the requirements for apparent agency, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that “a person in similar circumstances reasonably would have believed 
that the physician who treated him or her was a hospital employee.”  Id.  A patient’s 
actual knowledge that a physician was not a hospital employee would render that as-
sumption unreasonable.  Id.   
 143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1977). 
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treating physicians are not employees of the institution.
144
  While such 
action should be adequate to preclude liability on the basis of appar-
ent agency, courts have often found hospital notice to be artificial 
and therefore insufficient to immunize the institution from the ac-
tions of its physicians.
145
  Modern judicial treatment of this “notice” 
issue is reflective of the judiciary’s reaction to societal expectations 
compelling hospital accountability. 
C. Judicial Error in Analysis 
The above analysis reveals a common motivator driving judicial 
apportionment of hospital liability generally, and, specifically, for the 
negligent misconduct of independent contractor physicians operat-
ing within the hospital facility.  Initial erosion of charitable immunity 
was first compelled by the birth in public perception that “[p]resent-
day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do 
far more than furnish facilities for treatment.”
146
  Upon the collapse 
of total immunity, courts were placed in the difficult position of ap-
portioning liability in a unique hospital environment.  Given the per-
vasive nature of these relationships between hospitals and independ-
ent contractor physicians, courts applied commonly employed 
exceptions to the independent contractor rule of principal immuni-
ty.
147
  While the inclination of courts to apply common agency excep-
 
 144 See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1972); Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 94 (W. Va. 2004). 
 145 See, e.g., Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 54 
(Ohio 1994) (citing Steven R. Owens, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and the 
Evolution of Hospital Liability: Wisconsin Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 
1147(1990)) (finding that notice of independent contractor relationship will “rarely 
provide the patient with the ability to choose at a meaningful time”).   
The plaintiff, who by definition is injured and under stress, is relying 
upon the hospital to provide the services that the hospital has held out 
that it can provide.  The plaintiff’s reliance upon the hospital’s compe-
tence has been demonstrated by her walking (or being wheeled) into 
the emergency room.  Simply informing her that some doctors and 
staff have a different technical relationship with the hospital than the 
one she expected does not lessen the reasonableness of her reliance 
upon the hospital.  Even if the patient understood the difference be-
tween an employee and an independent-contractor relationship, in-
forming her of the nature of the relationship after she arrives is too 
late.  The purpose of any notice requirement is to impart knowledge 
sufficient to enable the plaintiff to exercise an informed choice. The 
signs suggested by the dissent are too little, too late.  
Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 50 n.1. 
 146 Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957). 
 147 See Sanchez v. Mary Wash. Hosp., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 331, 335 (Va. 2005) (“In vir-
tually all of these cases imposing vicarious liability, the particular jurisdiction in-
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tions was expected, the judiciary failed to account for the unique en-
vironment upon which such theories would fall.  Clearly, agency-by-
estoppel and apparent-agency theories, though readily applicable to 
commercial encounters, are poorly suited to guide liability imputa-
tion in hospital settings. 
Judicial manipulation of these guidelines reflects the very public 
policy that compelled the erosion of charitable immunity.
148
  The Su-
preme Court of Ohio accurately identified this driving recognition in 
Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Center.
149
  The Clark court 
stated that “[t]he public, in looking to the hospital to provide such 
care, is unaware of and unconcerned with the technical complexities 
and nuances surrounding the contractual and employment arrange-
ments between the hospital and various medical personnel operating 
therein.”
150
  The court then concluded that “[p]ublic policy dictates 
that the public has every right to assume and expect that the hospital 
is the medical provider it purports to be.”
151
  While the reality of this 
expectation is undoubted, the process by which courts have attempt-
ed to advance the same has ultimately hindered its purpose. 
Plainly, the overriding significance of the public’s concept of the 
contemporary hospital image has led courts to employ a result-
oriented approach to determining hospital liability.  Yet, the judiciary 
has employed a generally inappropriate means to achieve this end.  
Though well-intentioned and accurately reflective of societal expecta-
tions, the modern practice of attributing hospital liability is inherent-
ly flawed.  The consequences of this inconsistency are plainly evident 
 
volved had already adopted the theory of apparent agency or agency by estoppel as a 
basis of tort liability when the jurisdiction used the theory to hold a hospital vicari-
ously liable for the negligent medical care rendered by an . . . independent contrac-
tor.”). 
 148 Compare Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 9 (noting that “today’s hospital is quite different 
from its predecessor of long ago; it receives wide community support, employs a 
large number of people and necessarily operates its plant in businesslike fashion” in 
its decision to abandon charitable immunity), with Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53 (“With 
hospitals now being complex full-service institutions, the emergency room has be-
come the community medical center, serving as the portal of entry to the myriad of 
services available at the hospital.  As an industry, hospitals spend enormous amounts 
of money advertising in an effort to compete with each other for the health care dol-
lar, thereby inducing the public to rely on them in their time of medical need.  The 
public, in looking to the hospital to provide such care, is unaware of and uncon-
cerned with the technical complexities and nuances surrounding the contractual and 
employment arrangements between the hospital and the various medical personnel 
operating therein.”). 
 149 Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53.   
 150 Id. 
 151 Id.    
MONTEFUSCO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  5:21 PM 
2012] COMMENT 1359 
in the judiciary’s common relaxation and manipulation of tests em-
ployed to impute hospital liability.
152
  Judicial dedication to theories 
of agency by estoppel and apparent agency has resulted in wide-
spread artificiality in application.  Simply stated, courts are not being 
true to the tests that they purport to rely on. 
While the misapplication of these processes is certainly deserving 
of criticism, the true consequence of this practice runs deeper than 
being a mere procedural error.  Indeed, continued application of 
agency-by-estoppel and apparent-agency theories to the hospital set-
ting is inconsistent with the basic principles of liability imputation.  
Courts should reject this practice because it fails to advance the tort 
system’s “crucial objective” of preventing future harm. 
153
 
In addition to victim compensation, imputation of liability in 
tort should aim to address the underlying departure from standards 
of care and prevent an incident’s reoccurrence.
154
  This rationale 
serves as the very basis of principal non-liability and the independent-
contractor rule.
155
  As the principal in a true independent contractor 
relationship cannot, by definition, exert control over the acting 
agent, the principal is deemed poorly suited to prevent agent ne-
glect.
156
  Accordingly, on the basis of this relationship, courts have 
generally declined to impute liability to the removed principal.
157
 
The nature of this premise plainly illustrates the frailty of mod-
ern judicial analysis of hospital liability for the tortious conduct of in-
dependent contractor physicians.  By holding hospitals liable under 
 
 152 See, e.g., Kane v. Doctors Hosp., 706 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Monti v. 
Silver Cross Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).   
 153 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407; see also Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, 
Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1175 (Conn. 2006); Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 118 
(Tex. 2003).   
 154 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 8, at 407. 
 155 Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53.  The court in Clark indicated that vicarious liability will 
be imposed upon the relationship of master-servant, but not on the employer of and 
independent contractor.  Id.   In making this determination, the court must find that 
“the employer retain[ed] control, or the right to control, the mode and manner of 
doing the work contracted for.”  Id. (citing Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 16 N.E.2d 
447 (Ohio 1938)).   
 156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965). 
 157 See id. § 409 cmt. a (“The general rule stated in this Section, as to the 
nonliability of an employer for physical harm caused to another by the act or omis-
sion of an independent contractor, was the original common law rule.  The explana-
tion for it most commonly given is that, since the employer has no power of control 
over the manner in which the work is to be done by the contractor, it is to be regard-
ed as the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the prop-
er party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and 
distributing it.”). 
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theories of agency by estoppel or apparent agency, courts are attrib-
uting liability on the basis of exceptions to the general independent-
contractor rule of principal non-liability.  In so doing, however, 
courts are still honoring the existence of the independent contractor 
relationship between the hospital and treating physician.  Implicit in 
the acceptance of this relationship is the understanding that hospitals 
do not maintain control, or capability to control, the independent 
contractor physicians. 
Judicial acknowledgement of hospital liability as an exception to 
principal non-liability incentivizes hospitals to emphasize more out-
wardly their lack of control over physicians operating within hospital 
facilities so that they can insulate themselves from liability more effec-
tively.  This contemplated reaction is most clearly witnessed in the 
modern practice of hospitals who disclaim liability through the use of 
admission forms indicating that treating physicians are independent 
contractors and not employees of the hospital.  Yet, the judiciary’s in-
creasing disregard for such disclaimers suggests that hospitals will be 
held liable, not on the basis of exercised control, but rather as a re-
sult of the publicly recognized appearance that hospitals are neces-
sary full-service healthcare facilities. 
The consequence of this inconsistency between analysis and mo-
tivation is the imputation of liability to an entity that is still acknowl-
edged to be incapable of controlling the tortfeasor at issue. What is 
more, that same entity maintains an incentive to further distance it-
self from the underlying actor.  By disincentivizing hospital involve-
ment in medical practice, the judiciary has arguably prevented hospi-
tals from realizing their potential as organizations to prevent future 
harm.  This practice is inconsistent with principles of liability due to 
the fact that hospitals do not maintain additional incentives to im-
plement corrective measures, which are intended to prevent the re-
occurrence of an independent contractor physician’s negligent act.
158
  
Rather, hospitals that are held liable under apparent agency or agen-
cy by estoppel will have an incentive to take actions to remove them-
selves from the exception and restore their anticipated exemption 
from suit under the independent contractor rule.  Though compen-
sating aggrieved patients individually, this practice of imputation fails 
to serve the underlying purpose of liability—that of injury prevention. 
 
 158 Significantly, if it was determined that the hospital did in fact exercise control 
over a particular physician, the hospital would be held liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.   
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IV. NONDELEGABLE DUTY 
The judiciary has erred in its continued adherence to feigned 
agency principles.  Given the leniency of present standards, plaintiffs 
will face no legitimate obstacles in demonstrating hospital liability 
upon proof of the underlying tort.  This Comment therefore assumes 
that, going forward, hospitals will be held liable for the actions of in-
dependent contractor physicians in certain circumstances.  In light of 
that assumption, this Comment proposes a solution to the above-
discussed error in analysis.  This Comment argues for the imposition 
of a nondelegable duty on hospitals to provide specialized support 
services to the general public. 
The doctrine of non-delegable duty is a legal theory under which 
principals maintain primary responsibility for the negligent conduct 
of an independent contractor despite having delegated performance 
to another agent.
159
  The South Carolina Supreme Court explained 
the doctrine in Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center as a strict li-
ability concept whereby “[a] person may delegate a duty to an inde-
pendent contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that 
duty by acting negligently or improperly, the delegating person re-
mains liable for that breach.”
160
  The court noted further that “[i]t is 
the liability, not the duty, that is not delegable.  The party which owes 
the nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of 
the independent contractor.”
161
 
Application of this doctrine depends in large part on the social 
importance attached to the underlying activity that gave rise to the 
action in tort.
162
  Significantly, scholars have concluded that “[i]t is 
difficult to suggest any criterion by which the nondelegable character 
of such duties may be determined, other than the conclusion that the 
responsibility is so important to the community that the employer 
should not be permitted to transfer it to another.”
163
  Duties presently 
considered to be nondelegable include the duty of a common carrier 
to transport passengers safely, of a municipality to keep its streets in 
good repair, of a landlord to maintain common spaces, and of a rail-
road to properly maintain its tracks and safe crossings.
164
  Though fac-
 
 159 Renown Health, Inc. v. Vanderford, 235 P.3d 614, 616 (Nev. 2010).   
 160 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Marek v. Prof’l Health Servs., Inc., 432 A.2d 538, 546 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981).   
 163 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 71 at 
511–12 (5th ed. 1984).   
 164 Id. 
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tually dissimilar, these accepted nondelegable duties are considered 
so important to the community that the responsibility for their execu-
tion cannot be transferred to another entity.
165
 
Courts should extend the doctrine of nondelegable duty to hos-
pital operations for the same reason.  The importance of hospital ac-
countability has fueled the evolution of hospital liability since the ini-
tial demise of charitable immunity.
166
  Following the erosion of this 
immunity, public expectations of hospitals as direct caregivers have 
driven courts’ decisionmaking and has lead courts to validate these 
public beliefs in its near assurance of legal protection.
167
  This obser-
vation alone demonstrates that the overriding importance of hospital 
operations is sufficient to warrant the application of a nondelegable 
duty. 
Yet, in addition to that of the judiciary, legislative, and executive 
focus on hospital responsibility for its provision of healthcare services 
has also demonstrated the social importance of the provision of such 
services.  Specifically, hospitals participating in Medicare must com-
ply with a wide range of federal regulations.
168
  Hospitals are required 
to establish a program for “quality assessment” and “performance 
improvement.”
169
  Under the terms of this program, the participating 
hospital must ensure that it “focuses on indicators related to im-
proved health outcomes and the prevention and reduction of medi-
cal errors.”
170
  By the very terms of this regulation, hospitals are com-
pelled to take affirmative measures towards the improvement of 
patient care.
171
 These federal regulations demonstrate the govern-
ment’s interest in requiring hospitals to act for the benefit of its pa-
tients in particular circumstances. 
In addition to the efforts taken by the federal legislature, some 
courts have devised additional means for ensuring patient safety dur-
ing hospital stays.  Notably, certain jurisdictions have imposed an in-
dependent duty upon hospitals to monitor the practice and care of 
all physicians, which is actionable under the doctrine of negligent 
 
 165 See id.   
 166 See Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W. Va. 2004) (“The 
public’s confidence in the modern hospital’s portrayal of itself as a full service pro-
vider of health care appears to be at the foundation of the national trend toward 
adopting a rule of apparent agency to find hospitals liable, under the appropriate 
circumstances, for the negligence of physicians providing services within its walls.”).   
 167 See id.   
 168 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(1)(i) (2011). 
 169 Id. § 482.21. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id.  
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credentialing.
172
  Under this doctrine, courts impose a duty on hospi-
tals to ensure patient safety through the monitoring of physician 
practice within the hospital facility.
173
  In Johnson v. Misericordia Com-
munity Hospital, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this theory of 
liability forces on a hospital “a direct and independent responsibility 
to its patients . . . to take reasonable steps to (1) insure that its medi-
cal staff is qualified for the privileges granted and/or (2) to evaluate 
the care provided.”
174
  Importantly, the court in Johnson “pointed out 
that the physician’s status was irrelevant, explaining that the hospital 
was liable under the duty it owed to the plaintiff itself, not for the 
breach of duty by the physician under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior.”
175
  Thus, the concept of negligent credentialing further illus-
trates the social importance attached to the role of hospitals in deliv-
ering patient care. 
On the basis of this recognition, courts should employ an analy-
sis more true to its underlying motivation when apportioning liability 
for the medical malpractice of independent contractor physicians.  
Where, as here, relevant public policy considerations are the driving 
force behind hospital liability, courts should be honest about their 
motivation and hold that societal expectations of hospital accounta-
bility are “so important to the community that the employer should 
not be permitted to transfer it to another.”
176
  Significantly, 
nondelegation should apply to those contexts of medical malpractice 
in which the public policy commanding hospital liability is most 
strong. 
Courts have continually relied on the public perception “of the 
hospital as a health care facility responsible for the quality of medical 
care and treatment rendered” as a reason to manipulate established 
guidelines to apportion fault-based liability.
177
  This manipulation is 
most evident where a hospital is named as a defendant for the negli-
gent conduct of an independent contractor physician who did not es-
 
 172 See, e.g., Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
 173 See, e.g., Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003); Elam v. Coll. 
Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 
(Wash. 1984); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981). 
 174 Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 165. 
 175 Whitney Foster, Health Law—Negligent Credentialing and You: What Happens 
When Hospitals Fail to Monitor Physicians, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 321, 324 
(2009). 
 176 PROSSER ET AL., supra note 163, at § 71,  at 511–12. 
 177 Id. 
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tablish a relationship with the patient prior to admission.
178
  The Ap-
pellate Division of New Jersey, in Estate of Cordero, commented on the 
fact that, in a prior decision, “the court found conduct manifesting 
agency primarily because of the position in which the hospital placed 
the doctors.”
179
  The court in Estate of Cordero further added that 
“[c]ourts of other jurisdictions take [this] approach when a hospital 
has established and staffed facilities or departments through which 
patients receive specialized care from medical professionals with 
whom they do not have a prior or ongoing relationship.” 
180
  Thus, in 
the absence of a prior or ongoing physician-patient relationship, 
courts will likely conclude that the hospital has manifested its assent 
to an agency relationship with the treating independent contractor 
physician.
181
  Courts have strained to hold hospitals liable in these sit-
uations despite the express limitations of the tests applied because, in 
circumstances where no prior relationship exists, it reasonably ap-
pears that the hospital is providing the services at issue.
182
  Continued 
judicial focus on the existence of a prior relationship suggests its 
functional significance in apportioning liability. 
But the presence or absence of a prior relationship should not 
alone serve as the standard upon which a nondelegable duty will be 
imposed.  Determination of this relationship would necessarily in-
volve a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances of a plaintiff’s hospi-
tal entry.  Where, as in this Comment, the purpose of the proposed 
change in analysis is to force responsibility on an entity, the vehicle 
employed should be as brightline as possible.  Therefore, the object 
of non-delegation should be the type of medical service provided 
within the hospital facility.  The Illinois Supreme Court recapitulated 
the importance of this benchmark in York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. 
Luke’s Medical Center.183  The court in York stated, “If a patient does se-
lect a particular physician to perform certain procedures within the 
hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient nevertheless 
still reasonably relies upon the hospital to provide the remainder of 
 
 178 See Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp. 958 A.2d 101, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2008); Citron v. N. Dutchess Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 618, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
 179 Estate of Cordero, 958 A.2d at 109.   
 180 Id.   
 181 Id.   
 182 Citron, 198 A.D.2d at 620 (finding that where a plaintiff entered the hospital 
through the emergency room, the hospital’s employees called a number of physi-
cians to treat the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had no prior physician-patient relation-
ship with any of the treating physicians, the plaintiff “could properly assume that the 
treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on behalf of the hospital”).   
 183 854 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 2006). 
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the support services necessary to complete the patient’s treatment.”
184
  
Through this acknowledgement, the court in York implicitly recog-
nized that this benchmark applies to both methods of patient admis-
sion—emergency room and pre-arranged surgical entry.  In so doing, 
the court in York suggested that in nearly all cases of patient treat-
ment the hospital must provide medical services incidental to the 
primary reason for admission.
185
 
Thus, this Comment argues that courts should impose a 
nondelegable duty on hospitals for the offering of specialized support 
services to the general public.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
specialized support services are defined to include emergency room 
care, radiology, pathology, and anesthesia.  In almost all cases, the 
range of treating physicians with whom patients do not maintain a 
prior relationship will be coextensive with that range of physicians 
charged with the responsibility of providing specialized support ser-
vices within the hospital facility.  Therefore, courts utilizing this 
standard would impose liability on hospitals in the circumstances in 
which the judiciary has found public policy to be most compelling; 
but they will do so by using a brightline rule, which will be sufficient 
to accurately guide subject hospitals. 
The imposition of a nondelegable duty to hospitals that provide 
specialized support services to the general public would achieve the 
same result as that desired under the strained agency-by-estoppel and 
apparent-agency theories.  Yet, it will do so in a manner true to the 
analysis employed and more outwardly reflective of underlying moti-
vation.  The need for patient protection and the patients’ reliance on 
hospital offerings have forced this evolution in hospital liability.  This 
proposed change is necessary because it stands to protect such inter-
ests through the tort system’s natural process. 
Indeed, it is only through the adoption of a nondelegable duty 
that this system might operate as desired and decrease the likelihood 
of future harm.  By forcing hospitals to accept liability in certain in-
stances, such institutions are more likely to leverage their strengths as 
organizations in directly overseeing certain aspects of patient care.  
Through this oversight, hospitals would be permitted to freely con-
sider aggregate data arising out of institution-wide patient interaction 
and more accurately gauge trends in performance.  The application 
of a nondelegable duty directly incentivizes such practices because it 
 
 184 Id. at 670. 
 185 Id.  
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is only through the avoidance of harm that such institutions might 
escape liability.
186
 
Though its purpose is broad, the effect of this change would 
necessarily be precise.  By limiting a hospital’s nondelegation to spe-
cialized support services, courts will effectively target only those hos-
pital-physician relationships that create the appearance of an agency 
relationship.  This change in doctrine would specifically target spe-
cialized support services because courts recognize that these services 
as offered by the hospital rather than rendered through an inde-
pendent contractor physician.
187
  The court in Doctors Hospital of Au-
gusta v. Bonner accurately identified this understanding by observing 
that “anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists, and emergency 
room physicians all share the common characteristic of being sup-
plied through the hospital rather than being selected by the pa-
tient.”
188
  Furthermore, these fields of medical offerings have been 
traditionally characterized as “integral services” provided within the 
hospital facility.
189
  On the basis of this categorization, courts have dis-
tinguished radiology, pathology, anesthesia, and emergency room 
services from medical fields that are traditionally private.
190
  In each of 
these specialized fields of practice, the treating physician does not 
maintain a relationship with the patient prior to admission.
191
  Thus, 
under this theory of imputation, a hospital will only be held liable for 
those services that it reasonably appears to offer. 
Courts have more frequently applied theories of nondelegation 
to some individual components of specialized support services.  Sig-
nificantly, courts in the states of Alaska, Florida, and New York have 
applied the theory of non-delegable duty when construing a hospi-
tal’s role in providing medical care in its emergency room facility.
192
  
In Jackson v. Power, the Supreme Court of Alaska emphasized the 
commercialization of modern medicine and its resulting impact on 
 
 186 See, e.g., Simmons, 341 S.C. at 42 (“A person may delegate a duty to an inde-
pendent contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that duty by acting 
negligently or improperly, the delegating person remains liable for that breach. It 
actually is the liability, not the duty, that is not delegable. The party which owes the 
nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for negligent acts of the independent contrac-
tor.”) 
 187 Doctors Hosp. v. Bonner, 392 S.E.2d 897, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Paintsville 
Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ky. 1985). 
 188 Doctors Hosp., 392 S.E.2d at 908. 
 189 Jones v. Salem Hosp., 762 P.2d 303, 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985). 
 192 Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 318 (S.C. 2000). 
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the public perception of hospitals as institutions.
193
  As a consequence 
of this change in expectation, the court concluded that the imposi-
tion of a nondelegable duty on hospitals for their provision of emer-
gency room services was “consonant with the public perception of the 
hospital as a multifaceted health care facility responsible for the qual-
ity of medical care and treatment rendered.”
194
  The court held that, 
with respect to emergency room offerings, “[i]t is the hospital’s duty 
to provide the physician, which it may do through any means at its 
disposal.  The means employed, however, will not change the fact 
that the hospital will be responsible for the care rendered by physi-
cians it has a duty to provide.”
195
 
Some courts have also adopted the doctrine of nondelegable du-
ty for the provision of anesthesia to admitted patients.
196
  In Wax v. 
Tenet Health Sytem. Hospitals, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Florida con-
cluded that, on the basis of statutory regulation of anesthesia within 
the state of Florida, the subject hospital had a nondelegable duty to 
provide anesthesia in a reasonably safe fashion.
197
  Commenting on 
the court’s decision in Wax, the court in Kristensen-Kepler v. Cooney 
found that the “imposition of a non-delegable duty under such cir-
cumstances makes sense.”
198
  The court concluded that, in situations 
in which a hospital is obligated to provide medical services and di-
rects a physician to perform the same, the offering hospital should 
bear a nondelegable duty to provide that service in a non-negligent 
manner.
199
  The court’s recognition that the patient “has little, if any, 
control over who administers” medical care served as the basis for its 
conclusion.
200
 
Although no court has imposed a nondelegable duty on a hospi-
tal to provide all specialized support services, Chief Judge Altenbernd 
of the Florida District Court of Appeals advanced this argument in his 
concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Roessler v. Novak.
201
  Specifi-
cally, Chief Judge Altenbernd concluded that 
 
 193 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id.  
 196 See, e.g., Wax v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007).   
 197 Id. at 9.   
 198 39 So. 3d 518, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 858 So. 2d 1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
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[g]iven modern marketing approaches in which hospitals aggres-
sively advertise the quality and safety of the services provided with-
in their hospitals, it is quite arguable that hospitals should have a 
nondelegable duty to provide adequate radiology departments, 
pathology laboratories, emergency rooms, and other professional 
services necessary to the ordinary and usual functioning of the 
hospital.
202
 
Chief Judge Altenbernd justified the imposition of a duty on the 
grounds that, within the context of those service offerings, “the pa-
tient does not usually have the option to pick among several inde-
pendent contractors at the hospital and has little ability to negotiate 
and bargain.”
203
  Since the decision in Roessler, a number of courts 
have expressed their approval of Judge Altenbernd’s concurring 
opinion.
204
 
The imposition of a nondelegable duty on hospitals to provide 
specialized support services within their facilities should not disrupt 
present methods of talent acquisition.  Under this doctrine, hospitals 
would still be permitted to engage in the current practice of contract-
ing for the services of medical doctors with physician groups.
205
  Such 
hiring practices would not be disturbed by this Comment’s argument.  
Rather, the goal of this proposal is to change the subject hospital’s 
expectations of that contractual arrangement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the above analysis plainly demonstrates, courts have increas-
ingly held hospitals liable for the actions of independent contractor 
physicians despite the hospitals’ legitimate contractual insulation 
from liability.  This Comment concedes that, though generally incon-
sistent, this practice has advanced a major objective of the tort system.  
By holding hospitals liable for the negligent conduct of independent 
contractor physicians, the courts have undoubtedly facilitated an al-
ternate and potentially more reliable mechanism for compensation 
of aggrieved patients.  In so doing, however, courts have ignored the 
 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Kristensen-Kepler, 39 So. 3d 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Wax v. Tenet Health 
Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 205 Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2000) (“A per-
son may delegate a duty to an independent contractor, but if the independent con-
tractor breaches that duty by acting negligently or improperly, the delegating person 
remains liable for that breach.  It actually is the liability, not the duty, that is not dele-
gable. The party which owes the nondelegable duty is vicariously liable for negligent 
acts of the independent contractor.”). 
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most critical purpose of the tort system—that of injury prevention.  
Within this very context, courts have demonstrated that, the judiciary 
has overlooked the tort system’s inherent desire to “give parties with 
crucial duties a keen incentive to do everything possible to avoid vio-
lating those duties” by holding hospitals liable under exceptions to the 
general rule of non-liability.
206
  This Comment recommends adopting 
principles of nondelegation for hospital offerings specialized support 
services to rectify this omission. 
The most significant consequence of adopting non-delegation in 
this context lies within the theory’s harmony with the doctrinal prin-
ciples of liability.  By eliminating the possibility of hospital non-
liability, hospitals will lose incentive to distance themselves from cer-
tain aspects of care delivery.  This is because, under theories of 
nondelegation, hospitals would not be permitted to escape liability 
on the basis of a legitimate appearance of true independent contrac-
tor relationships.  In mandating accountability of hospitals in their 
provision of specialized support services, courts may motivate an enti-
ty to prevent instances of future neglect more adequately. 
 
 
 206 Simmons, 533 S.E.2d at 321. 
